为了便于阅读放了中文机翻，原文在后。
弗朗蒂罗诉理查德森案
口头辩论-1973年1月17日
沃伦 · e · 伯格
We’ll hear arguments next in 71-1694, Frontiero against Laird.
莱文先生。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
首席法官先生，请允许法庭。
这是一起性别歧视案件。
在简要陈述这里的事实之后，我将反驳政府对这一案件的统计分析，并指出我们当时认为政府有意继续这一特定性别歧视的证据。
在此之后，我将简要地谈谈通过我们所认为的中间测试来判断性别分类的优点。
然后，我左边的金斯伯格教授将讲述通过严格审查标准来判断这些案件的优点。
1968年加入武装部队一年后，Sharron Frontiero 中尉与 Joseph Frontiero 结婚。
由于这里所讨论的法规，武装部队中的任何男性成员都自动有权享受某些住房津贴和医疗福利。
但 Frontiero 中尉没有。
法律规定，军队中的男性必须有不可推翻的前提，即他们的配偶是受扶养人，并且不论妻子实际的经济依赖程度如何，他们都可以获得福利。
女性必须证明她的配偶实际上依赖她获得其一半以上的支助。
在这种情况下，Frontiero 中尉挣的钱是她丈夫 Joseph 的三倍多。
她的收入大约是8200美元。
他的收入刚刚超过2800美元。
但是由于约瑟夫的个人开支很低，他的微薄收入满足了他个人开支的一半以上。
现在，Sharron 因此被剥夺了为她的配偶提供住房和医疗补助的权利。
无可争议的是，根据这些法规，这里争论的是，男性武装部队成员应该得到这些住房和医疗福利。
所以我们有双重歧视。
第一个是程序性的。
妇女被迫承担证明其配偶实际上依赖她们的负担和不确定性，而男子则自动和无可辩驳地获得福利。
但更重要的是，这里存在着实质性的歧视。
妻子在经济上不依赖他们的男性，仍然可以得到这些住房和医疗福利。
妇女在完全相同的情况下，完全相同的情况下不会得到这种福利。
政府实际上试图通过说这只是程序上的差别来解释这种歧视。
而且，由于女性收入低于男性，她们可以为了自己的利益而假定，我说的是一般人口中的女性，她们可以为了行政便利或行政便利而假定男性配偶在经济上是独立的。
对于政府关于低收入表明依赖性的论点，我们有三个相对简单的答案。
首先，收入水平并不一定意味着依赖，只是因为 --
沃伦 · e · 伯格
你认为它们是否表明了一种普遍的趋势？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
我认为，收入水平，甚至不是一个普遍的趋势，我认为你可以说，在整个人口中，它确实表明了一种趋势，即男性比女性挣得多，我们对此不予置疑。
我们对此毫无异议。
但是，约瑟夫 · 弗朗提耶罗的费用只是因为——只是因为他的费用很低，因为从技术上讲，他并没有一半的经济依赖于他的妻子沙伦 · 弗朗提耶罗，而这是根据这些法规，妇女被迫服从的标准和标准。
尽管他的收入还不到她收入的三分之一。
因此，虽然我们认为收入和开支在这个问题上是相关的，但政府希望只考虑收入。
如果他们真的相信收入是依赖性的唯一预测器，那么为什么不把它作为确定依赖性的标准。
相反，他们选修了一门生物学课程，名女性，他们毫无保留地将这种地位赋予整个阶级。
如果他们相信低收入等于依赖，那么就让他们以收入作为标准来保护自己的利益，而在性别歧视方面，他们可以通过一个狭义的法规来做到这一点。
现在，我们怀疑政府在其摘要中所指的，如果我没记错的话，经济生活的事实真的是事实。
他们自己的统计数据在我们的蓝色简报的第51页显示，军队中的男性实际上比女性挣得少。
现在，如果低收入等于依赖性，那么大多数现在被无可辩驳地假定为依赖性的武装部队男性将无法证明他们的配偶是依赖性的。
现在，他们说我们使用这种比较是不公平的，就像把苹果和桔子混在一起一样。
波特 · 斯图尔特
这是一个中等收入的军队男性和-
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
是的，长官。
波特 · 斯图尔特
原因是女性中士官和士官的比例更高？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
我不..
波特 · 斯图尔特
这就是原因，不是吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
很有可能。
波特 · 斯图尔特
我们面对的是军人，他们的配偶是平民，不是吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
是的，先生。
但是让我们——
波特 · 斯图尔特
难道不是吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
——我们假设政府说我们不应该用这种情况的说法是正确的。
波特 · 斯图尔特
这些案件是否仅涉及其配偶为平民的军事人员？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
是的，先生。
会的。
波特 · 斯图尔特
没错。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
没错。
现在，让我们假设政府以这种方式对我们的分析所说的话是正确的。
他们建议我们应该使用所有女性的数据，而不是仅仅使用劳动人口中的女性数据。
好吧，就这么办。
现在的人口普查显示，对所有女性而言，这是针对所有14岁以上的人群的，不管她们是否有工作，所有女性的平均收入为2400美元。
如果我们把军人男性的平均收入(3700美元)和女性的平均收入(6100美元)放在一起计算，我们得出的平均收入是6100美元。
现在，我们回顾的依赖标准是一半事实上或一半依赖。
如果一个女人不能为他提供，空军或任何军人的妻子——如果她不能提供，她自己一半的支持，她就必须支付总共4800美元的费用，这将超过整个家庭收入的80% 。
现在，我们不认为政府可以在这里证明或说服家庭的妻子这样挥霍无度，我不相信这无论如何都能证明它。
但是这整个统计学的分析方法是极具误导性的。
我们不认为它在这个案例中有任何特别的相关性，因为它的关键方面是在这里产生的实质性的不平等。
那就是，当你深入到底部，那些无法证明他们妻子依赖他人的男性，仍然可以获得这些福利。
处于相同位置的女性则不会，而且也没有办法治愈这种情况。
在 Sharron Frontiero 的案例中，没有办法解决这个问题。
波特 · 斯图尔特
我们在讨论什么是数字的条件？
我想98-99% 的军事人员是男性还是更高的比例？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
我不知道这些百分比。
我回顾的数字是，大约有105名已婚男性服役人员，我指的是政府的新数字，超过6000名已婚女性服役人员，即 --
波特 · 斯图尔特
那么这个百分比——和我刚才提到的有点类似吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
他们很可能是。
我没有计算这个，但是我想说那是 --
波特 · 斯图尔特
因为我知道，政府的论点的好处是建立在简化行政管理的基础上，不是吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
贾斯蒂斯先生，政府论点的唯一部分，他们的整个论点是基于行政便利。
这就是他们所说的一切。
对他们来说，这是唯一的正当理由，我们不会说这是一个不合法的结局，因为它当然不是。
但它本身并不能证明这里存在的歧视是正当的。
如果是这样的话，任何武断的削减福利都是符合宪法的。
在 Shapiro 诉 Thompson 案，Reed 诉 Reed 案中，我们认为本法院明确驳回了行政便利以证明这种歧视是正当的。
夏皮罗案的法院明确指出，无论是以理性基础还是强制性国家利益标准衡量，这种利益都是不够的。
现在，政府建议在这里采用最低检讨标准。
法庭之友，美国公民自由联盟法律顾问委员会已经提出---- 并将争辩说，严格的嫌疑人分类标准适用于这个案件。
现在，我们建议。
我们，作为上诉人，建议严格的标准适用于-，这里的严格标准不提出在两极选择之间的选择。
我们完全同意鲍威尔法官先生在韦伯诉安特纳一案中所说的话。
不管这里使用的检验标准是什么，本质探究不可避免地是一个交易，什么合法的国家利益是分类所促进的，什么基本的个人权利，可能会被分类所危害。
在这里，我们谈论的分类围绕着就业福利，这是一个歧视妇女的领域---- 一直是歧视的对象，我认为这是有据可查的。
政府的做法采用了某种逆向的自力更生理论，他们的理由是，传统的歧视和就业应该得到进一步的歧视和就业福利的奖励，如果你看看他们试图使用的数字。
现在，我们面对的是妇女免受这些不平等待遇的权利，而政府面对的是妇女免受不平等待遇的权利，这就是管理的便利。
这是他们在这种情况下唯一真正推进的东西。
威廉 · h · 伦奎斯特
莱文先生，根据韦伯的分析，你说你在这里主张的是个人权利。
但是这是一种个人的权利，不是吗？
你现在还要说什么？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
这是个人权利。
大法官伦奎斯特先生，免受歧视和就业是个人权利。
而且 --
威廉 · h · 伦奎斯特
好吧，但是你可以用这种方式来争论任何平等的保护。
你实际上是在说，我想摆脱这种我声称存在的歧视。
但是我认为如果你遵循韦伯的类比，你会看到你的主张是什么，如果你的主张被支持，你会得到什么？
沃伦 · e · 伯格
哪个更有钱？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
是的，先生。
我也这么认为。
但是，我认为，根据我所谈论的权利，我认为法院所谈论的那种个人权利，以及鲍威尔先生在韦伯案中为法院所谈论的那种个人权利，是 -- 是群体不受歧视的权利，这是妇女作为一个群体不受歧视的权利，而且你必须看到那个案件所涉及的事实。
你必须看到事实，你必须确定政府是否已经提出充分或合法是这里的措辞，政府的利益。
例如，有证据表明，与战斗表现有关的性别差异是合法的政府利益。
也许吧。
我不是说它会是，但它可能是，在这里，空军当然没有声称，你看到的总体人口收入差异将证明基本工资的歧视，性别歧视。
所以，这当然不能成为性别歧视附加福利的理由。
我们认为鲍威尔法官先生对韦伯案的分析是确定在这个案件中使用什么标准的合法方法。
它比政府提出的最低限度审查标准更为严格。
我们认为，政府和政府都有责任表明非法的政府利益，上诉人也有责任表明存在歧视。
我们认为这里应该有同样的负担。
这个测试应该比它本身更有力
波特 · 斯图尔特
过去有一种过时的想法，认为由国会颁布的法令或由州立法机关颁布的法令可以假定是符合宪法的。
我们已经很少听到这样的事情了，但是——
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
法官大人
波特 · 斯图尔特
我认为，当我上法学院的时候，这就是法律原则。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
嗯，我认为，这是好的，除非国家分类不同的群体，特别是当他们分类的群体，传统上是歧视的对象，因此，在性别歧视案件的较低标准，最低限度的审查标准根本是不够的。
波特 · 斯图尔特
现在，这个领域制定的法律只是第一步，不是吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
第一步，在测试之前就欠下它。
波特 · 斯图尔特
是的。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
嗯，我认为立法机关在通过立法时应该考虑到这一点，他们应该确保你没有招致反感的歧视。
波特 · 斯图尔特
我提到的规则建设，某种程度上是基于这样一种假设，即国会将在制定立法之前审议《宪法》。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
是的，先生。
好吧，--
波特 · 斯图尔特
这就是制定法规的基础，国会可以像其他人一样阅读宪法。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
本案中的上诉人会说，显然，国会在颁布这些具体条款时没有过多注意《宪法》。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
但是这份记录是否显示了请愿者是一名志愿者还是应征入伍的？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
请愿者在某种意义上是一个志愿者。
她——空军让她完成了一部分学业，作为回报，她有义务在空军服役。
所以这是一个中的六个，另一个中的六个，我想说，可能是一个志愿者。
我花的时间太多了。
我希望金斯伯格教授发言的上诉人各自的立场是严格的观点，这是要辩论，并认为，在这个案件是必不可少的，她有机会提出口头辩论，向法院。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
很好。
Mrs. Ginsburg.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
首席法官先生，请允许法庭。
Amicus 认为这个案子和 Reed 诉 Reed 404美国案有关。两者的立法判断都来源于同样的刻板印象。
该男子是或应该是婚姻单位中的独立伴侣。
除了偶尔的例外，这个女人是依赖型的，没有挣钱养家的经历。
Appellees 在答复本案中的询问时说，他们仍然完全不知道这种陈规定型观念是否适用于家庭，即他们不知道军人挣工资的妻子的比例是小、大还是中等。
已知的是，通过采用性别标准，情况相同的人被区别对待。
已婚军人不论其配偶的收入如何，均可获得本人及其配偶的福利。
已婚服役妇女得不到配偶的医疗照顾，得不到自己和配偶的四分之一津贴，即使在这种情况下，她提供了婚姻单位三分之二以上的支助。
由于这些原因，法庭之友认为国会使用的与性有关的手段不符合合理性标准。
它与立法目标没有公平和实质性的关系，因此所有类似处境的人都应得到相同的待遇。
尽管如此，法庭之友敦促法院在本案中承认它在其他案件中所拥有的东西，它不仅仅是为本案和今天而写，而是为这类案件而写。
正如我们摘要第27至34页引用的判决所表明的那样，在下级联邦法院和州法院，性别歧视案件的复审标准至少可以说是混乱的。
一些法院将性别列为可疑标准。
其他人，包括本案的下级法院，似乎认为里德案的判决是实施最低限度审查的一个方向，两者之间存在着各种各样的差异。
其结果是，在许多情况下，同样或类似的问题根据法院认为审查的严格程度是否适当而作出不同的决定。
为了提供如此迫切需要的指导，并且因为早就应该承认，法庭之友敦促法院宣布性别为可疑标准。
这将不会是一个巨大的步骤，appellee 建议。
正如冈瑟教授在1972年11月《哈佛法律评论》上发表的对上学期平等保护决定的分析中指出的那样，在里德案中，对性作为一种分类因素的某种特别怀疑进入了法院的分析。
阿佩利斯承认，性别标准中存在着涉及严格审查的主要因素。
性别似的种族是一个可见的、不可改变的特征，与能力没有必然的联系。
类似性别的种族已经成为不合理的或者至少是未经证实的假设的基础，这些假设涉及到个人对社会的表现或贡献的潜力。
但是 appellees 指出，虽然导致分类的基本要素是存在的，但是与种族区分不同的基于性别的区分并没有一个特别不受欢迎的宪法历史。
很明显，第十四条修正案的核心目的是消除令人反感的种族歧视。
但是为什么第十四条修正案的制定者认为种族歧视是可憎的呢。
因为一个人的肤色与能力没有必然的关系，同样，阿佩利斯承认，一个人的性别与能力没有必然的关系。
此外，民族血统和异族关系已被确认为可疑的分类，尽管在第十四修正案通过时，新来到我国的人并不是我国最关心的问题。
但是，反对将性别作为可疑标准的论点主要集中在两点上。
首先，女性占大多数。
其次，有人断言，按性别划分的立法分类并不意味着妇女的低人一等。
关于数字的争论，直到1920年，数字多数甚至被剥夺了投票权。
今天，妇女在就业方面面临的歧视比少数群体面临的歧视更为普遍和微妙。
在职业教育和高等教育中，妇女继续面临限制性配额，对其他人口群体不再适用。
在联邦和州立法、行政和司法法庭中，在高级公务员职位以及在联邦、州和地方政府的指定职位上，他们的缺席是显而易见的。
当然，在哥伦比亚特区，没有人会认为种族不是一个可疑的标准，因为这里的黑人人口多于白人。
此外，正如道格拉斯先生最近在哈德利针对第3205届阿拉巴马第41届法律周指出的那样，平等保护和正当法律程序适用于多数群体和少数群体。
由于性别分类列出的应用意味着自卑的判断。
甚至下面的最高法院也建议他们这么做。
法院说，如果它没有注意到潜伏在背后的对服役女性的微妙伤害，被区别对待的侮辱，她们中的许多人感觉，那将是失职。
性别分类的确让人感到耻辱，因为在 Goesaert，它们把女性排除在一个被认为更适合男性的职业之外。
当性别标准仅用于限制妇女的工作时间时，它就是污名化的。
穆勒对俄勒冈州的工作时间规定虽然在世纪之交的情况下也许是合理的，但是今天却保护女性不去竞争额外的报酬、更高的工作和晋升。
性别标准在霍伊特针对美国佛罗里达州368的案件中被污名化，它假设所有的女性都全神贯注于家庭和孩子，因此应该免除担任陪审团成员的基本公民责任。
这些区别有一个共同的作用。
他们帮助女人保持自己的位置，一个比男人在我们的社会中占据的位置更低的位置。
阿佩尔斯承认，性别分类并没有把女性划分为低等的理论在当代的有效性存在疑问。
但他们主张，除非并直到平等权利修正案生效，否则本法院应保持原有立场。
被告坚持认为，如果没有平等权利修正案，就没有必要对基于性别的分类进行仔细的审查。
本法院应坚持本案所涉及的那类立法。
作出区分的立法规定，女兵被认为是最冷酷的平等，是最大的刺激因素，也是最具歧视性的有关中等兵役妇女的规定。
但是，本法院已经认识到，构成平等保护的概念确实发生了变化。
平等权利修正案的支持者和反对者都认为，有必要澄清对性别标准适用平等保护的问题，并应由本法院作出澄清。
支持者认为，对第五修正案和第十四修正案的适当解释将确保男女享有平等的权利和责任。
但他们也强调，这种解释尚不明确，无论如何，修正案将起到重要作用，消除哪怕是最微小的疑问，即男女平等权利是基本的宪法原则。
在请求法院宣布性别为可疑标准时，法庭之友强烈要求援引萨拉 · 格里姆克在1837年强行阐述的立场，萨拉 · 格里姆克是著名的废除死刑主义者和男女平等权利的倡导者。
她说话不是很优雅，但是非常清楚。
她说: “我不要求别人帮我的性别。
我只求我们的弟兄们把他们的脚从我们的脖子上拿下来。”
最后，法庭之友与上诉人一起要求本法院推翻下文作出的判决，并指示将案件发回重审，准予上诉人申诉中所要求的补救。
谢谢你。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
谢谢你，金斯伯格夫人。
亨廷顿先生。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
首席法官先生，请允许法庭。
在这种情况下，政府的立场首先是，在这里审查的法规中，对武装部队男女成员的不同待遇有一个合理的基础。
第二，合理的依据标准是确定这些法规有效性的适当标准。
我想先谈谈法规，然后再讨论适当的审查标准。
我认为从审查住房津贴和医疗保健法规的实际影响开始是有益的。
住房津贴法令是《美利坚合众国法典》第37编第403节，规定向无法获得基本住房的军人发放基本住房津贴。
此外，如果每个成员有《美利坚合众国法典》第37编第401节规定的一名或多名家属，则有权享受增加的住房津贴。
例如，根据现行的薪级表，二级工资中尉无家属住房每月有权得到138.60加元，有家属住房每月有权得到175.80加元，相差37.20加元。
现在，这里的具体问题当然是关于在什么情况下武装部队成员可以声称配偶是受扶养人。
法规的一般规则是，男性成员的妻子自动有资格领取抚养津贴，而女性成员的丈夫只有在事实上依赖妻子提供一半以上抚养费的情况下才有资格领取抚养津贴。
波特 · 斯图尔特
这项房屋津贴是否适用于所有委任和非委任职级？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
是的，它适用于每个人。
波特 · 斯图尔特
我知道这是个数目，但是—— ？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
这里有一个数字。
是的。
波特 · 斯图尔特
谢谢你。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
首先我想指出的是
波特 · 斯图尔特
除了那些由政府提供住房的人？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
是的，没错。
住房是可用的，而且——
波特 · 斯图尔特
对于个人和他的家庭，以及他或她的家庭？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
对。
我想指出的是
拜伦 · r · 怀特
嗯，就像你说的，歧视是针对男人的，是吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我不是故意暗示的。
不，这是 -- [试图笑]
我想指出的是，在《美国法典》第37编第420节以下的跨职务婚姻中，丈夫和妻子都不能声称自己的配偶是受抚养人。
现在，这一事实在这里具有相当重要的意义，因为武装部队中绝大多数已婚妇女嫁给了军人。
现在，虽然在这个问题上没有记录，但参议院去年就国会提出的修改这些法规的建议发表的报告载有国防部总法律顾问的一封信。
在参议院第92-1218号报告的报告第4页，信中指出，最近完成的对空军已婚妇女的调查显示，25% 的军官已婚，但只有4% 的军官与平民结婚，空军中所有与平民结婚的妇女的百分比甚至更低。
与军人结婚的军人妇女不能要求她们的丈夫作为受抚养人，因此不受歧视，因为她们的丈夫也不能要求她们这样做。
同样，一个女性成员----
瑟古德·马歇尔
但是女人得到平等的唯一方法就是不要丈夫。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，那就是 -- [笑声]
瑟古德·马歇尔
是这样吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
单向的，是的。
这也是事实，这些嫁给军人的妇女在医疗福利方面没有受到歧视，因为根据《美国法典》第10编第1074节，丈夫和妻子都有资格享受医疗福利。
那么，简而言之，唯一受到区别对待的女性就是那些嫁给平民的女性。
现在，在我们看来，人们不需要费很大力气就能找到国会决定在抚养津贴方面区别对待已婚男性和已婚妇女的理性依据。
我们从这两部法律的基本宗旨开始。
其基本目的是为家属提供住房津贴和医疗福利，以便建立一种补偿模式，吸引职业人员加入武装部队。
在国会看来，这将使军方能够在已婚人士的经济领域与民间部门展开竞争。
现在，为了确立这些福利，国会必须决定需要什么样的依赖性证据。
现在，对这一法规的审查表明，如果一名军人很有可能支助某些亲属，则在一名军人支助一个人的可能性较小或不常见的情况下，自动给予抚养津贴，需要提供抚养证明。
因此，根据《美国法典》第37编第401节，军人的妻子和未成年子女自动有资格享受抚养津贴，而他年龄较大的子女和父母只有在事实上受抚养的情况下才有资格享受抚养津贴。
由于妇女一般不为其丈夫、子女或父母提供主要的支助，因此在每一种情况下，服役妇女都必须建立事实上的依赖关系。
让我用另一种方式来说明这一点。
以100多万已婚军人作为一个群体，他们的妻子绝大多数都要依赖他们。
在这种情况下，决定自动向所有已婚男子提供其妻子的抚养津贴是合理的，而不是在每个案件中承担确定抚养的沉重行政负担。
另一方面，如果把与平民结婚的一千或两千名军人妇女作为一个群体来看，她们的丈夫绝大多数并不依赖她们。
在这种情况下，个别审查军人妇女可能有受扶养丈夫的少数情况是合理的。
波特 · 斯图尔特
我们在谈论----
瑟古德·马歇尔
关于你们的理性关系，你打算和里德一样对抗里德吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
是的，我们认为里德和里德是有区别的。
我只想谈一下关于大多数妇女依赖其丈夫的说法的统计基础。
美国公民自由联盟在他们的摘要中引用了这样一个事实: 60% 的与丈夫同居的妇女都有收入。
当然，这个事实的反面是40% 的已婚妇女没有工作。
此外，正如美国公民自由联盟摘要中引用的其他数据显示的那样，在那些工作的人中，只有一部分是全职工作。
为了准备这个论点，我看了 --
拜伦 · r · 怀特
你是说90% 还是你知道什么？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我认为他们的数据是43% 的女性从事劳动力，18% 的女性从事全职工作。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
18%.
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
这是美国公民自由联盟简报的第45页。
在我们摘要中引用的美国统计摘要中，有一个表格显示，1970年，在丈夫和妻子都工作且丈夫不到35岁的白人家庭中，妻子对家庭总收入的主要贡献是27.1% 。
这是统计摘要第327页的表格。
相比之下，在黑人家庭中，妻子的主要贡献略高于33.4% 。
简而言之，毫无疑问，在大多数家庭中，丈夫仍然是主要的收入来源。
在许多家庭，他们提供唯一的收入。
在其余的家庭中，她们对家庭总收入的贡献总和完全超过了职业妻子的贡献总和。
现在，如果今天这是真的，我们认为，23年前和17年前，当这里的法规获得通过时，这在更大程度上是真的。
另一方面，大多数男人并不依赖于他们的妻子，这一点是毋庸置疑的。
正如我们在摘要中所指出的，几乎所有已婚工作和家庭工作都是夫妻双方的工作，丈夫的收入通常远远高于妻子的收入。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
这些领域是否存在作为政府目标的一部分的欺诈危险，或者假设你正在试图确定父母或年龄较大的子女是否有依赖性，你是否只是拿一份宣誓书或者你是怎么做的？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
他们填写一张表格列出他们的开支。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
这就是结局了，不是吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
你说什么？
拜伦 · r · 怀特
就这样了，不是吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我相信那可能是。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
你说的那个大行政负担是什么？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，对于一百五十万男人来说，要检查一百五十万份表格，我提交将是一个行政负担-
拜伦 · r · 怀特
但是我的意思是，我同意这是一种负担，但是我只是想知道这种负担到底有多重。
只是..
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧
拜伦 · r · 怀特
——写一份宣誓书，那么我想，就得有人来宣读了。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
做一份宣誓书，然后有人阅读它，并决定它是否是正当的，我认为，这就是所涉及的。
我认为，如果军方注意到证据证明宣誓书是假的，那么你就必须进一步调查。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
但难道不会是另一种方式吗——-让女人说出来怎么样——-我想你可以用另一种方式对待女人和男人一样。
波特 · 斯图尔特
所有行政部门的声音重叠。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
你是说完全拒绝给他们福利？
甚至没有给他们一个机会表现出他们——
拜伦 · r · 怀特
对待他们就像 --
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
或者像对待男人一样对待他们; 当然，国会可以这样做——
瑟古德·马歇尔
这就是全部的论点？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
——上届国会中向国会提交的一项提案——这项提案很可能在这个时候重新提交——就是修改法令，以同样的方式对待妇女。
我想说的是
沃伦 · e · 伯格
这是否包括显示依赖项的要求？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
不，那将——不会有任何要求——配偶和未成年子女的抚养津贴将自动同时赋予男子和——
沃伦 · e · 伯格
参议院法案会给请愿者们他们在这里要求的东西吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
哦，是的，没错。
但是我们认为，虽然这可能是一个很好的建议，国会可能会采纳它，但是在法规中所作的分类，是有合理的基础的，正是已婚军人作为一个群体与未婚军人作为一个群体的不同统计特征，证明了在这里的不同待遇。
瑟古德·马歇尔
我敢肯定，这些争论在过去的40年里一直没有停止过，不是吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
你是说40年来一直如此？
不，因为我..
瑟古德·马歇尔
当然，它们每年都有所不同。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我给出的统计数据是本年度或者最近几年的。
瑟古德·马歇尔
这难道不是法令的依据吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
这项法令是基于20年前的情况而制定的
瑟古德·马歇尔
在立法史上是否有任何证据表明他们考虑了这些因素？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
不，没有。
立法史仅仅表明——
瑟古德·马歇尔
女人就是女人，男人就是男人。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
法令的目的是给予依赖者---- 为依赖者提供福利。
现在我要说的是
瑟古德·马歇尔
除了应该对军队中的男女进行区分之外，我是否理解立法历史？
在立法史上除了这个法令还有别的什么吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
根本不是这样的。
我的意思是法令本身就说明了这一点。
立法史上唯一的一件事就是，通过给家属发放津贴，你可以给军人更好的补偿，这样你就可以和民间经济部门竞争。
现在，我仍然要说，很明显，国会正在努力解决这样一个问题，即如何确定谁是家属。
对他们来说，确定在男人的情况下，你假设妻子是自动依赖的是合理的，因为把男人的阶级作为一个整体来对待，这通常是正确的。
这是对待女性阶层的态度---- 这通常是不正确的。
瑟古德·马歇尔
我们以整个妇女一般阶层和整个男子一般阶层为基础。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
是的，但是我们认为有一个
瑟古德·马歇尔
这是一个合理的基础。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我们认为这是一个合理的基础。
瑟古德·马歇尔
这是一个合理的基础。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
是的。
瑟古德·马歇尔
是的！
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我们认为这是一个合理的基础，因为这两个类别之间存在统计学上的差异，从而证明——
瑟古德·马歇尔
有什么好的区别是国会认为。
你说不行。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我说立法历史并没有表明他们，他们，他们看过了。
立法的历史相当沉默。
我说，你不需要走很远就能在这里找到潜在的理性。
我认为这是相当明显的。
我不认为这是那种你必须绞尽脑汁才能在法律背后想出一些可以想象的理由的情况。
我认为，正如我所指出的那样，理性是一个如果它不能从法规中引出的理性，这是一个相当明显的理性。
瑟古德·马歇尔
女人就是女人，男人就是男人，你可以画出这个区别，而这个区别只是基于金钱。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，我想简单地说，这里存在统计学上的差异，这些差异确实证明了不同的待遇是正确的。
现在我想谈谈里德和里德的案子。
在这种情况下，如你所记得的，法院审查了爱达荷州的一项法规，其中规定，如果同一优先群体中的一男一女提出竞争性的遗产管理申请，则应给予该男子优先权并予以任命。
现在，记录中没有任何证据表明男子作为一个阶层比妇女更善于管理，法院驳回了这样一种论点，即采取这种措施是为了节省诉讼费用。
简而言之，在两类申请者中，男性和女性没有任何差别，这证明了歧视的合理性。
相比之下，已婚军人作为一个阶层与已婚妇女之间存在着非常真实和相关的统计差异，这证明了我们认为在本案中审查的分类是合理的。
现在我想谈谈根据第五修正案的正当程序条款适用何种适当标准来确定这些法规的有效性的问题。
首先，由于本法院已经审理了许多案件，根据第十四条修正案制定的传统平等保护原则在审议第五条修正案规定的税收时具有相关性，该修正案指控联邦法规对不同类别的个人进行了不公正的歧视。
现在正如我们今天在这里所谈到的，传统的平等保护检验是合理的基础检验。
虽然最初是在涉及规范商业的法律案件中制定的，但近年来这一检验标准已经适用于涉及经济和社会利益的案件。
现在，正如 Levin 先生和 Ginsburg 教授所指出的那样，法院对两类案件的法定分类实行了更严格的审查标准; 一类案件涉及影响基本个人权利的分类，另一类案件涉及固有的可疑分类。
就个人权利而言，我不同意莱文先生的观点，即个人权利的类型引入了发挥这一点，这里涉及的标准，权利是两个受抚养人的利益。
这些与丹德里奇案中审查的经济利益类型相同，我认为韦伯案中涉及非婚生子女与家庭单位中婚生子女之间关系的个人权利类型不在审查范围之内。
这里的权利，所以我们会说，更严格的审查，如果它要适用于所有在这种情况下，它必须是因为性是一个可疑的分类。
让我简单地评论一下冈瑟教授在《哈佛法律评论》上的文章。
他在那里暗示，在最近的案件中，最高法院并没有局限于一个极端。
但是，在审查法规时，即使在应用理性基础检验来确定是否实际上涉及某些政府利益时，法院也一直在进行相当仔细的审查——这是显而易见的，你不必费力想象就能想出来。
我们认为，在这种情况下，这里的分类在这种方法下经得起仔细检查。
现在我想谈谈金斯伯格教授的论点，即基于性别的分类对于平等保护和正当程序的目的是值得怀疑的。
首先，正如金斯伯格教授所承认的那样，最高法院从未将基于性别的分类视为天生可疑。
并且仅在上学期里德对里德应用了传统的理性基础检验。
我们认为，法院现在不应放弃传统的检验标准，而将性别分类视为可疑的标准。
就在上周，美国最高法院在决定维持50美元的申请费作为解除债务和破产的前提条件时，提到了种族、国籍和异化的可疑标准。
当然，种族分类在我们的宪法史上有着特别不受欢迎的地位。
在格雷厄姆诉理查森一案中，布莱克门法官用了三种不同的说法，其中每一种都包含了“一个谨慎而孤立的少数派，对他们来说，加强司法关怀是恰当的”
现在，这些少数民族普遍缺乏保护自身利益的政治权力。
现在，我们并不认为女性已经获得了与男性平等的政治权力。
金斯伯格教授引用的统计数据显示，在州和联邦立法机构担任高级政府职位的女性人数当然不存在争议，她们非常少。
我们的确认为，由于他们在总人口中占多数，他们一直在对州和联邦立法机构施加实质性和日益增长的政治影响。
在联邦一级，正如美国公民自由联盟的摘要中所概述的那样，在修订包含基于性别的分类的法规方面有相当多的立法活动。
正如我已经说过的，修改这些法规的立法提案去年已经提交给国会，今年无疑也将提交给国会。
当然，去年通过的平等权利修正案也是一个证据，它表明了支持修正案的妇女所能发挥的影响力。
另一个原因是没有将可疑分类的类别扩大到包括妇女。
与基于种族、国籍或异族的分类不同，基于性别的分类往往不是任意的，而是反映与载有分类的法规的宗旨有关的两性之间的实际差异。
现在，我们在这里主张，依附性法规，例如，不歧视妇女，因为她们的女性特质。
他们区别对待女性，因为作为一个阶层，女性比男性更不可能有依赖者。
同样地，佛罗里达州的法律认为，霍伊特对佛罗里达州的指控并不是因为女性低人一等而免除她们的陪审员职务，而是因为女性作为阶级比男性更有可能承担家庭责任，这使得她们作为陪审员不切实际。
采用合理的基础检验标准使法院能够根据具体案件审议法规，以确定哪些分类是基于两性之间有效的事实或生理差异，哪些分类是任意的，而不是基于性别差异。
另一方面，将性别分类定为可疑的，将使所有载有性别分类的法规受到严格审查，并可能导致其中许多法规无效，无论个别分类是否反映公认的事实或生理差异。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
但是，当你谈到女性普遍不太可能有家眷时，你是指狭义上的家眷，经济上的家眷？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
定义的依赖——是的，依赖——
沃伦 · e · 伯格
在孩子方面？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
不，就受抚养配偶而言，这就是我的意思。
好吧，最后，让我简单地说，我们对任何妇女通过攻击在不同时代颁布的法规来实现平等的动力没有异议，这些法规可能反映了对两性各自角色的陈旧观念。
然而，我们认为，要求全面改革的请求，而不是逐案审议的请求，最好是向立法机关提出，而不是向法院提出。
最后，区域法院的判决应予维持。
谢谢你。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
我可以问你——如果我们同意另一方的意见，你认为后果会是什么？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我知道这样做的后果是，你会把同样的好处扩展到女性身上。
我认为----
拜伦 · r · 怀特
我们要打击什么？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
你可以删除法令中说妇女必须建立依赖关系，才能声称她们的妻子是 -- 的部分
拜伦 · r · 怀特
或者我们取消那些为他们提供零用钱的条款，那么他们如何得到零用钱呢？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
不，你不会罢工的。
你只会删除那部分要求他们建立依赖关系的内容
拜伦 · r · 怀特
好吧，如果你只是消除了歧视，另一种方式就是说，雄性必须证明
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
男性必须——嗯，我认为这肯定不是最好的选择。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
我不是说更好，我只是想知道你怎么知道是哪一个？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
嗯，我认为 -- 我认为这里的调查会是国会所希望的，如果它面临着不能进行这种分类的情况，我认为结论会是他们希望 --
拜伦 · r · 怀特
我们能否只删除该条款规约的特定部分，仅仅删除这些特定词语？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
没错。
是的。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
然后我们把所有其他相关的法律解释为，男性或女性，无论它们说什么
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，只是在这个狭隘的背景下。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
我在这些章程中所说的。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
在《美国法典》第43章第37节第401节。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
那么，我们废除一个法令，重新制定其他的法令？
或者至少——
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
嗯，不，只是在定义部分本身将是唯一的---- 如果你简单地说，同样的标准必须适用于女性和适用于男性。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
嗯，一个 --
沃伦 · e · 伯格
那么我们为什么不能简单地，为什么我们不能简单地说，既然津贴是歧视性的结论，所有的津贴都被取消了呢？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，我认为这将会公然违背国会通过抚养津贴法案的目的
沃伦 · e · 伯格
除了数字以外，还有什么更重要的吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
哦，是的，但是我认为数字[笑声的尝试]是相当相关的，当你谈论一百五十万个男人和只有一对夫妇的一千个女人嫁给平民。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
你不希望我们取消男人的津贴吗？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
不，我们不希望你们删除这一条，我们也不希望你们要求在每个案例中都要审查男性申请抚养津贴的申请。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
事实上，在401法案中，受抚养人的定义是---- 服务对象的一方是他的配偶，另一方是未婚的未成年子女。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，如果你只是敲击 --
拜伦 · r · 怀特
然而，在它下面写着，第一个成员不是女性成员的依赖者，除非他实际上依赖于她超过一半的支持。
现在，我们要打倒什么？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
那句话。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
那句话。
那么，对于一个男人独立是没有规定的，因为在上面，只有一个女性成员，他的配偶。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我想”他的”在这里指的是她。
至少在某些领域——[笑声]
拜伦 · r · 怀特
显然，我的意思是，如果宪法歧视什么，是吗？
沃伦 · e · 伯格
对。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
好吧，如果法令总是被解释为 --
拜伦 · r · 怀特
其实不是这样的，不是吗？
这意味着他的，这意味着他的，因为 --
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
我是说下一个，他未婚的合法孩子。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
所以我们必须把“他的”的意思改成一个词，不是吗？
沃伦 · e · 伯格
我们必须让它真的是他的还是她的？
拜伦 · r · 怀特
我们必须把它变成他的还是她的？
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
那么为什么要做一个完整的工作。
你可以这样做，但是方式 -- [笑声]
——但是法令的解释方式与她和他的是可以互换的。
瑟古德·马歇尔
那么我们是不是应该假设这个案子的上访者不赞成把妻子得到的津贴全部取消呢。
塞缪尔·P·亨廷顿
你当然可以这么想，我们并不是建议你这么做。
谢谢你。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
如果你想用的话，莱文先生，你还有三分钟。
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
我愿回答怀特法官先生关于应该废除规约中哪一条的问题。
沃伦 · e · 伯格
重写？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
首先，我认为你不会陷入任何麻烦，通过打击那部分开始然而和支持。
拜伦 · r · 怀特
为什么不呢？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
因为我不相信“他的”在男性意义上是他的 --
拜伦 · r · 怀特
这意味着不---- 现在不是吗？
小约瑟夫 · j · 莱文。
没有，长官。
现在不是这个意思了。
因为你在这里的唯一限制不是一个女性成员的依赖，除非他实际上是依赖的
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Frontiero v. Richardson
Oral Argument - January 17, 1973
Warren E. Burger
We’ll hear arguments next in 71-1694, Frontiero against Laird.
Mr. Levin.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.
This is a sex discrimination case.
After a short statement of the facts here, I will seek to refute the Government’s statistical analysis of the case and point to what we consider to be then substantiability of the Government’s interest in continuing this particular sex discrimination.
Following this, I will speak briefly about the merits of judging sex classifications by what we consider to be an intermediate test.
Professor Ginsburg to my left will then speak on the merits of judging these cases by standard of strict scrutiny.
A year after entering the Armed Forces in 1968, Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero married Joseph Frontiero.
Because of the statutes which are at issue here, any male member of the Armed Forces would have automatically become entitled to certain housing allowance benefits and medical benefits.
Lieutenant Frontiero did not.
The statutes giving males in the Armed Forces the irrebuttable presumption, that their spouses are dependent, and grant benefits regardless of the wives’ actual financial dependency.
A female must prove that her spouse is in fact dependent upon her for more than one-half of his support.
In this case, Lieutenant Frontiero earns more than three times as much as her husband Joseph.
Her income is approximately $8,200.
His income is just a little in excess of $2,800.
But because Joseph’s individual expenses are low, his small income meets more than half of his personal expenses.
Now, Sharron was therefore denied any supplemental benefits in both housing and medical for her spouse.
It’s undisputed that under these statutes, the ones which are at issue here that male Armed Forces member would have received this housing and medical benefits.
So we have a two-fold discrimination.
The first is procedural.
Women are forced to the burdens and uncertainties of proving that their spouses are in fact dependent upon them while males are given the benefits automatically and irrefutably.
But more importantly, there’s a substantive discrimination here.
Males whose wives are not financially dependent upon them, nevertheless receive these housing and medical benefits.
Women in precisely the same circumstances, identical circumstances do not receive the benefits.
And the Government really seeks to explain a way this discrimination by saying that it’s only a procedural difference.
And that since women earn less than men that they can presume for the sake, and I’m talking about women in the general population that they can presume for the sake of administrative convenience or administrative ease that the male spouses are financially dependent.
We have three relatively simple answers to the Government’s contention that lower income shows dependency.
First of all, earning levels don’t alone necessarily indicate dependency only because --
Warren E. Burger
Did they indicate a general tendency, do you think?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
I think that earning level, not necessary even a general tendency I would think that you could say that in the whole population that it does indicate a tendency that men earn more than women, and we don’t dispute that.
We don’t dispute that at all.
But the only reason that Joseph Frontiero’s expense that the -- only because his expenses are low as he is technically not one-half financially dependent upon his wife, Sharron Frontiero, which is the criteria and the standard that women are forced to submit to under these statutes.
And this is -- in spite of the fact that his income is less than one-third of her income.
So, though we feel that income and expenses are relevant in this case, the Government wants to take into account only income.
If they really believe that income is the only predictor of dependency then why not make that the standard for determining dependency.
Instead, they take a biological class, women, and they ascribe the status to the entire class without reservation.
If they believe that lower income equals dependency then let them protect their own interest by making that, that is income the criterion and in the sex discrimination they could do this with a narrowly drawn statute.
Now, we doubt that what the Government refers to in its brief as, if I recall correctly, economic facts of life are really facts at all.
Their own statistics is set out on page 51 of our own blue brief show that Armed Forces males actually are earn less than females.
Now, if lower income equals dependency then the majority of Armed Forces males who are now granted in irrefutable presumption, would not be able to prove their spouses dependent.
Now, they say that our use of this kind of comparison is unfair kind of like mixing apples and oranges.
Potter Stewart
This is a median income of Armed Forces males and --
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Of Armed Forces males, yes, sir.
Potter Stewart
The reason is there is a higher percentage of non-commissioned and commissioned officers among the female?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
I don’t --
Potter Stewart
Well, that would have to be the reason, wouldn’t it?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
It very well could be.
Potter Stewart
And we’re dealing here with military personnel whose spouses are civilians, are we not?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Yes sir.
But let’s --
Potter Stewart
Are we not?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
-- let's assume that the Government is correct in what they say that we should not have used this case.
Potter Stewart
Does these case involved only military personnel whose spouses are civilians?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Yes, sir.
It would.
Potter Stewart
That’s right.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
That’s correct.
Now, let’s say that the Government is correct in what they have to say about our analysis that way.
They suggest that we should instead use the figure for all women instead of just women in the working population.
Well, let’s do that.
Now the census shows that for all women and this is for everyone over the age of 14, regardless of whether or not they are employed that for all women as a median income of $2,400.
And if we lump the military male’s median income which is $3,700 with the median income for the female, we come up with a $6,100 lump sum median.
Now, the dependency standard we recall is one-half in fact or one-half dependency.
For a woman to fail to provide, that is the wife of an Air Force or any Armed Services member for him -- for her to fail to provide, one-half of her own support, she would have to have expenses that total $4,800 which would be over 80% of the entire family’s income.
Now, we don’t think that the Government can prove or saying here that service family's wives such spendthrifts, I don’t believe this anyway to prove it.
But this whole analytical approach of statistics is extremely misleading.
We don’t think that it has any particular relevance in this case because the crucial aspect of it is the substantive inequality which results here.
And that is that when you get right down to the bottom that males who cannot prove their wives dependent, nevertheless, receive the benefits.
Women in the identical position do not and there’s no way to cure that.
There’s no way to cure that in Sharron Frontiero’s case.
Potter Stewart
What are we talking about the terms of numbers?
I suppose what 98-99% of the military personnel are males or is that to a higher percentage?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
I don’t have access to these percentages.
As I recall the figures are that there are approximately a million five married male service members and that there are somewhere in excess of, I am talking the Government new figures, are somewhere in excess of 6,000 married female service members, that’s --
Potter Stewart
So would this percentage of -- somewhat comparable to that I mentioned?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
They very well could be.
I have not computed this, but I would say that that was --
Potter Stewart
Because I understood that the good part of the Government’s argument is based upon administrative simplicity, is it not?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Mr. Justice, the only part of the Government’s argument, their entire argument is based upon administrative convenience.
And that is all that they have alleged.
To them, that’s the only justification and we don’t say that this is an illegitimate end because of course it isn’t.
But it in itself cannot justify the discrimination that exists here.
If it did then any arbitrary cut off in benefits would be constitutional.
In Shapiro versus Thompson, in Reed versus Reed, we feel that this Court explicitly rejected administrative convenience as justifying this kind of discrimination.
And the court in Shapiro explicitly stated that this interest was insufficient regardless of whether measured against the rational basis or the compelling state interest standard.
Now, the Government has proposed that the minimal standard of review be used here.
The amicus, American Civil Liberties Union has proposed that the -- and will argue that the strict standard of suspect classification is appropriate for this case.
Now, we suggest.
We, as appellant suggest that the strict standard applicable in the -- that the strict standard here does not pose a choice between polar alternatives.
We agree wholeheartedly with what Mr. Justice Powell had to say in Weber versus Aetna.
That regardless of the test employed here, that the essential inquiry is inevitably a deal what legitimate state interest does the classification promote and what fundamental personal rights, might the classification endanger.
Now here, the classification that we’re talking about surrounds employment benefits and this is an area of discrimination in which women had been discriminated against -- been the object of discrimination, I think and that’s well documented.
The Government’s approach employs sort of reverse bootstraps theory where their reasoning is that traditional discrimination and employment should be rewarded by further discrimination and employment benefits, if you look at the figures that they attempt to use.
Now, we got stack up against the woman’s right to be free from these inequalities and what the Government stacks up against the right of women to be free inequalities is the ease of administration.
That’s the only thing that they really advanced in this case.
William H. Rehnquist
Well, Mr. Levin, you say that it’s a personal right you claim here, following the analysis in Weber.
But it’s a personal right to more money, isn’t it?
Well, what more you are claiming now?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
It’s a personal right.
It’s a personal right, Mr. Justice Rehnquist to be free from discrimination and employment.
And it --
William H. Rehnquist
Well, but you can argue any equal protection that way.
You are saying in effect, I want to be free from this discrimination that I claim exists.
But I would think if you follow the Weber analogy, you got to see what it is your claiming, what you would get if your claim were sustained?
Warren E. Burger
Which is more money?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Yes, sir.
I think so too.
But I think with the right that I’m talking about and I think that the kind of personal right that Court is talking about and Mr. Justice Powell is talking about for the Court in Weber was – was the right to be -- for group to be free from discrimination, here that’s the right for women as a group to be free from discrimination and that you got to look at the facts involved in that case.
You have to look at the facts and you have to determine whether or not the Government has advanced to sufficient or legitimate is the language is here, governmental interest.
For example, evidence might be adduced to show that a sex difference which related to performance in combat would be a legitimate governmental interest.
That might be.
I am not saying it would be but it might be and here, the Air Force certainly doesn’t claim that the general earning differentials that you see in the population as a whole would justify discrimination, sex discrimination in basic pay.
So, it certainly couldn’t justify sex to discrimination in fringe benefits.
We think that Mr. Justice Powell’s analysis in Webber is a legitimate method for determining what standard to be used in this case.
It’s stronger than the minimal scrutiny standard which the Government proposes.
We feel that a burden should be placed on both the Government, the Government to show illegitimate governmental interest and on the appellant to show that there is discrimination.
We think that there should be equal burdens here.
The test should be stronger than it is --
Potter Stewart
There used to be an old-fashioned idea that a statute enacted by the Congress or statute enacted by the legislature of the state was presumptively constitutional.
We don’t hear much about that anymore but --
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Your Honor, --
Potter Stewart
I think that -- when I went to law school, that’s what the doctrine was.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Well, I think that, that is fine except when the state is classifying different groups and especially when they are classifying a group which is traditionally been the object of discrimination, and consequently, the lower standard in sex discrimination cases, the minimal scrutiny standard simply isn’t sufficient.
Potter Stewart
Now, it gets so that statutes enacted in that area is only so to step one, isn’t it?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Step one owe it before its test.
Potter Stewart
Yes.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Well, I think the legislature should consider this in passing legislation and they should make sure that you don’t have invidious discrimination.
Potter Stewart
The rule construction to which I referred was sort of based upon the hypothesis that Congress would consider the Constitution before it enacted legislation.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Yes, sir.
Well, --
Potter Stewart
That was the basis of that rule statutory construction, that the Congress could read the Constitution as well as other people.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Appellants in this case would say that apparently, the Congress did not pay too much attention to the Constitution in enacting these particular provisions.
Warren E. Burger
But does this record show whether the petitioner was a volunteer or was drafted into the Army?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Petitioner was in a sense a volunteer.
She -- the Air Force put her through some portion of her schooling and in return she was obligated to serve in the Air Force.
So it’s six of one, half a dozen of another, I would say that probably a volunteer.
I have used more time than I should have.
I’d like Professor Ginsburg to speak the appellant’s respective position of strict view that is going to argue and felt that it was essential in this case that she be given an opportunity to present oral argument to the Court.
Warren E. Burger
Very well.
Mrs. Ginsburg.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.
Amicus views this case as kin to Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. The legislative judgment in both derives from the same stereotype.
The man is or should be the independent partner in a marital unit.
The woman with an occasional exception is dependent, sheltered from bread winning experience.
Appellees stated in answer to interrogatories in this case that they remained totally uninformed on the application of this stereotype to serve as families that is they do not know whether the proportion of wage-earning wives of servicemen is small, large, or middle size.
What is known is that by employing the sex criterion, identically situated persons are treated differently.
The married serviceman gets benefits for himself, as well as his spouse regardless of her income.
The married servicewoman is denied medical care for her spouse and quarter's allowance for herself as well as her spouse even if as in this case, she supplies over two-thirds the support of the marital unit.
For these reasons, amicus believes that the sex-related means employed by Congress fails to meet the rationality standard.
It does not have a fair and substantial relationship to the legislative objective so that all similarly circumstanced persons shall be treated alike.
Nonetheless, amicus urges the Court to recognize in this case what it has in others, that it writes not only for this case and this day alone, but for this type of case.
As is apparent from the decisions cited at pages 27 to 34 of our brief, in lower federal as well as state courts, the standard of review in sex discrimination cases is to say the least confused.
A few courts have ranked sex as a suspect criterion.
Others, including apparently the court below in this case, seem to regard the Reed decision as a direction to apply minimal scrutiny and there are various shades between.
The result is that in many instances, the same or similar issues are decided differently depending upon the court’s view of the stringency of review appropriate.
To provide the guidance so badly needed and because recognition is long overdue, amicus urges the Court to declare sex a suspect criterion.
This would not be quite the giant step appellee suggests.
As Professor Gunther observed in an analysis of last term’s equal protection decisions published in the November 1972 Harvard Law Review, it appears that in Reed, some special suspicion of sex as a classifying factor entered into the Court’s analysis.
Appellees concede that the principle ingredient involving strict scrutiny is present in the sex criterion.
Sex like race is a visible, immutable characteristic bearing no necessary relationship to ability.
Sex like race has been made the basis for unjustified or at least unproved assumptions, concerning an individual’s potential to perform or to contribute to society.
But appellees point out that although the essential ingredient rendering a classification suspect is present, sex-based distinctions unlike racial distinctions do not have an especially disfavored constitutional history.
It is clear that the core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate invidious racial discrimination.
But why did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment regard racial discrimination as odious.
Because a person’s skin color bears no necessary relationship to ability, similarly as appellees’ concede, a person’s sex bears no necessary relationship to ability.
Moreover, national origin and alienage have been recognized as suspect classifications, although the new comers to our shores was not the paramount concern of the nation when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
But the main thrust of the argument against recognition of sex as a suspect criterion centers on two points.
First, women are a majority.
Second, legislative classification by sex does not, it is asserted, imply the inferiority of women.
With respect to the numbers argument, the numerical majority was denied even the right to vote until 1920.
Women today face discrimination in employment as pervasive and more subtle than discrimination encountered by minority groups.
In vocational and higher education, women continue to face restrictive quotas no longer operative with respect to other population groups.
Their absence is conspicuous in Federal and State Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Chambers in higher civil service positions and in appointed posts in federal, state, and local government.
Surely, no one would suggest that race is not a suspect criterion in the District of Columbia because the black population here outnumbers the white.
Moreover, as Mr. Justice Douglas has pointed out most recently in Hadley against Alabama 41 Law Week 3205, Equal Protection and Due Process of law apply to the majority as well as to the minorities.
Due to sex classifications listed by appellees imply a judgment of inferiority.
Even the Court below suggested that they do.
That court said it would be remiss if it failed to notice lurking in the background the subtle injury inflicted on servicewomen, the indignity of being treated differently so many of them feel.
Sex classifications do stigmatize when as in Goesaert against Cleary 235 U.S., they exclude women from an occupation thought more appropriate to men.
The sex criterion stigmatizes when it is used to limit hours of work for women only.
Hours regulations of the kind involved in Muller against Oregon though perhaps reasonable on the turn of the century conditions, today protect women from competing for extra remuneration, higher paying jobs, promotions.
The sex criterion stigmatizes when as in Hoyt against Florida 368 U.S, it assumes that all women are preoccupied with home and children and therefore should be spared the basic civic responsibility of serving on a jury.
These distinctions have a common effect.
They help keep woman in her place, a place inferior to that occupied by men in our society.
Appellees recognize that there is doubt as to the contemporary validity of the theory that sex classifications do not brand the female sex as inferior.
But they advocate a hold the line position by this Court unless and until the equal rights amendment comes into force.
Absent the equal rights amendment, appellees assert, no close scrutiny of sex based classifications is warranted.
This Court should stand pat on legislation of the kind involved in this case.
Legislation making a distinction, servicewomen regard as the most frozen equity, the greatest irritant and the most discriminatory provision relating to women in the middle -- in the military service.
But this Court has recognized that the notion of what constitutes equal protection does change.
Proponents as well as opponents of the equal rights amendment believe that clarification of the application of equal protection to the sex criterion is needed and should come from this Court.
Proponents believe that appropriate interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would secure equal rights and responsibilities for men and women.
But they also stressed that such interpretation was not yet discernible and in any event the amendment would serve an important function in removing even the slightest doubt that equal rights for men and women is fundamental constitutional principle.
In asking the Court to declare sex a suspect criterion, amicus urges a position forcibly stated in 1837 by Sara Grimke, noted abolitionist and advocate of equal rights for men and women.
She spoke not elegantly, but with unmistakable clarity.
She said, “I ask no favor for my sex.
All I ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our necks.”
In conclusion, amicus joins appellants in requesting that this Court reverse the judgment entered below and remand the case with instructions to grant the relief requested in appellants complaint.
Thank you.
Warren E. Burger
Thank you Mrs. Ginsburg.
Mr. Huntington.
Samuel Huntington
Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.
A position of the Government in this case is first that there is a rational basis for the different treatment of male and female members of the Armed Forces in the statute here under review.
And second, that the rational basis standard is the proper standard for determining the validity of those statutes.
I would like to first address myself to the statutes and then discuss the appropriate standard of review.
I think it would be useful to begin by reviewing the actual impact of the housing allowance and medical care statutes here in issue.
The housing allowance statute is 37 U.S.C. 403 grants a basic housing allowance to each member of the military for whom on-base housing is not available.
In addition, each such member is entitled to an increased housing allowance if he has one or more dependents as defined by 37 U.S.C. 401.
Under the scale which is now in existence, for example, a lieutenant in Pay Grade II would be entitled to $138.60 for -- per month for housing without dependents and $175.80 with dependents, a difference of $37.20.
Now, the particular issue here of course concerns under what circumstances a member of the Armed Forces may claim a spouse as a dependent.
And the general rule under the statute is that wives of male members qualified automatically for dependency benefits, whereas husbands of female members qualify only if dependent in fact on their wives for over half of their support.
Potter Stewart
Does this housing allowance run right through all of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks?
Samuel Huntington
Yes, it applies to everyone.
Potter Stewart
There is an amount, I know, but --?
Samuel Huntington
There is an amount.
Yes.
Potter Stewart
Thank you.
Samuel Huntington
I would like to point out, now first --
Potter Stewart
Except those for whom housing is provided by the Government?
Samuel Huntington
Yes, right.
Housing is available and --
Potter Stewart
For the person and his family, and his or her family?
Samuel Huntington
Right.
I would like to point out that under --
Byron R. White
Well, as you put it, the discrimination is against the men, is that it?
Samuel Huntington
Well, I didn’t mean to imply that.
No, it’s --[Attempt to Laughter]
The -- I’d like to point out that under 37 U.S.C. 420 in the case of an inter-service marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may claim his or her spouse as a dependent.
Now, this fact has considerable importance here for a significant majority of married women in the Armed Force are married to military men.
Now while the record is silent on this matter, the Senate Report issued on the proposals in Congress last year to amend these statutes contained a letter from the general counsel of the Department of Defense which is in point.
In the letter, at page 4 of the report that’s Senate Report 92-1218, it is noted that a recently completed survey of married women in the Air Force show that 25% of the officers were married, but that only 4% of the officers were married to civilians and the percentage of all women in the Air Force married to civilians is even smaller.
In not being able to claim their husbands as dependents, military women married to military men are not discriminated against since their husbands could not claim them either.
Similarly, a female member --
Thurgood Marshall
[Voice Overlap] But the only way for the woman to get equality as to put a husband as none.
Samuel Huntington
Well, that would be --[Laughter]
Thurgood Marshall
Is that right?
Samuel Huntington
One way, yes.
Well, this is also true that these women who married the military men are not discriminated with respect to medical benefits because under 10 U.S.C. 1074 both the husband and the wife would qualify for medical benefits.
Well, in short then the only women who are treated differently then their male counterparts are those women who are married to civilian.
Now, in our view, one does not have to search far to discover a rational basis for Congress’ decision to treat married men and married women differently with respect to dependency benefits.
We start with the basic purpose of the two statutes.
And the basic purpose is to provide housing allowance and medical benefits for dependents in order to establish a compensation pattern which would attract career personnel into the Armed Forces.
In Congress’ view, this would enable the military to compete with the civilian sector of the economy for married people.
Now in establishing these benefits, Congress had to determine what proof of dependency it would require.
Now, an examination of this statute shows that where it was very likely that a military person would be supporting certain relatives, dependency benefits were conferred automatically where it would be less likely or unusual that a military member would be supporting a person, proof of dependency was required.
Thus, under 37 U.S.C. 401, a serviceman’s wife and minor children automatically qualify for dependency benefits, whereas, his older children and his parents would qualify only if dependent in fact.
And since women, generally do not provide the main support for their husbands, children, or parents, servicewomen were required to establish to establish dependency in fact in each case.
Let me state this in other way.
Taking the over one million married military men as a group, a significant majority of their wives are the dependent upon them.
Under these circumstances, it is rational to decide to grant all married men dependency benefits for their wives automatically rather than undertaking the heavy administrative burden of determining dependency in fact in each case.
On the other hand, taking the one or two thousand military women who are married to civilians as a group, an overwhelming majority of their husbands are not dependent upon them.
Under these circumstances, it is rational to examine individually the few instances where a military woman might have a dependent husband.
Potter Stewart
We’re talking --
Thurgood Marshall
On your rational relationship, are you going to square this with Reed against Reed as some?
Samuel Huntington
Yes, we think Reed against Reed is distinguishable.
Let me just addressed myself to the statistical basis for a statement that the majority of women are dependent upon their husbands.
The ACLU cites in their brief the fact that 60% of all women living with their husbands are gainfully employed.
Well, the converse of this fact of course is that 40% of all married women are not employed.
Moreover, of those who work, as other figures cited in the ACLU brief indicate, only a portion work full time.
In preparing this for this argument I looked at the --
Byron R. White
You mean like a 90% or what ir do you know it?
Samuel Huntington
Well, I think the figure in their brief was that 43% of women are in the labor force and 18% work full time.
Byron R. White
18%.
Samuel Huntington
That’s at page 45 of the ACLU brief.
In the statistical abstract of the United States which is a document which is cited in our brief is a table that shows that in 1970, in white families where both the husband and wife worked and the husband is under 35; the main contribution of the wife to the total family income was 27.1%.
That’s at the table at page 327 of the statistical abstract.
In comparable, black families, the main contribution the wife was slightly higher at 33.4%.
In short, there can be no question but that husbands still provide the primary income in most families.
In many families, they provide the only income.
In the remaining families, their aggregate contribution to the total family income, totally eclipses the aggregate contribution of working wives.
Now, if that is true today, we submit that 23 years ago and 17 years ago when the statutes here were passed, it was even true to a greater extent.
Now on the other side of the coin, it can hardly be disputed that most men are not dependent upon their wives.
As we note in our brief, almost all married work and in families were both the husband and the wife work, the husband’s income is generally well above the wife's.
Byron R. White
Is there some danger of fraud in these areas as part of the Government’s aim or let’s assume that you are trying to determine if the parents or older children are dependent, do you just take an affidavit or what do you do?
Samuel Huntington
They fill out a form listing their expenses.
Byron R. White
That will be the end of it, isn't it?
Samuel Huntington
I beg your pardon?
Byron R. White
That’s the end of it, isn’t it?
Samuel Huntington
That, I believe that probably is.
Byron R. White
What is the -- is that the large administrative burden you’re talking about?
Samuel Huntington
Well, for a million and a half men to have to examine a million and a half forms, I submit would be an administrative burden to --
Byron R. White
But I mean, I agree it’s a burden but I’m just trying to find out how much of the burden it is.
It’s just --
Samuel Huntington
Well --
Byron R. White
-- making an affidavit, and then somebody will have to read them, I suppose.
Samuel Huntington
Making an affidavit and then somebody reading it and making a determination as to whether it’s justified, I think that’s -- that is exactly what’s involved.
I suppose that if evidence came to the Military's attention that the affidavit was false then you would have to investigate further.
Byron R. White
But wouldn’t it be the other -- how about – how about letting the women claim -- you could treat women the same as men the other way I suppose.
Potter Stewart
[Voice Overlap] of all administration.
Samuel Huntington
You mean deny them benefits altogether?
Not even give them a chance to show that they --
Byron R. White
Well, treat them like --
Samuel Huntington
Or treat them the way the men; well, certainly Congress could do that --
Thurgood Marshall
That is the whole argument?
Samuel Huntington
-- and the proposal before Congress in the last Congress and it probably be resubmitted at this time is to amend the statute to treat women exactly the same way.
What I’m saying here is --
Warren E. Burger
Would that include a requirement to show a dependency?
Samuel Huntington
No, that would -- there would be no requirement -- dependency benefits for spouse and minor children would be conferred automatically both on men and --
Warren E. Burger
The Senate Bill would give the petitioners exactly what they’re asking for here?
Samuel Huntington
Oh, yes, that’s right.
But we submit that while that may be a good suggestion and Congress may adopt it but there is rational basis, for the classification made in the statutes, and it is the difference statistical characteristics of married military men as a group compared with not married military women as a group which justify the different treatment here.
Thurgood Marshall
Those contentions haven’t been consistent I’m sure, aren’t they, for 40 years?
Samuel Huntington
You mean consistent for 40 years?
No, as I --
Thurgood Marshall
Of course, they vary every year.
Samuel Huntington
Well the statistics I gave were for the current year or in the last couple of years.
Thurgood Marshall
And that would not what the statute was based on?
Samuel Huntington
The statute was based on the situation 20 years ago and as --
Thurgood Marshall
Is there any evidence in the legislative history that they consider those factors?
Samuel Huntington
No, there is not.
The legislative history simply indicates that --
Thurgood Marshall
Women are women and men are men.
Samuel Huntington
The statute was designed to give dependent -- to give benefits for dependence.
Now what I am stating --
Thurgood Marshall
Do I understand the legislative history other than there should be a distinction made between men and women in the Armed Services?
Is there anything else in the legislative history on this statute other than that?
Samuel Huntington
Well, it’s not even that.
I mean the statute speaks for itself on that point.
The only thing in the legislative history is that by giving allowances for dependents, you would compensate military personnel better so that you could compete with the civilian sector of the economy.
Now, I still say that it is apparent that Congress wrestled with the question of how do you determine who’s the dependent.
And that it was rational for them to determine that in the case of men you assume that wives are dependent automatically because treating the class of men as a whole that is generally true.
Treating the class of women it is -- it is generally not true.
Thurgood Marshall
We base it on the whole general class of women and the whole general class of men.
Samuel Huntington
Right, but we submit that there is a --
Thurgood Marshall
And that’s a rational basis.
Samuel Huntington
We submit it’s a rational basis.
Thurgood Marshall
That’s a rational basis.
Samuel Huntington
Yes.
Thurgood Marshall
It is!
Samuel Huntington
We submit it is a rational basis because there’s statistical differences between the two classes which justify --
Thurgood Marshall
What’s the good difference is that Congress consider.
You said not.
Samuel Huntington
I said the legislative history doesn’t indicate that they – they -- they looked at it.
The legislative history is fairly silent.
I say, you don’t have to go very far to find an underlying rational here.
I think that this is fairly apparent.
I don’t believe this is the type of case where you have to strain your imagination to dream up some conceivable rational behind the statute.
I think the rational as I’ve indicated is one which if it doesn’t lead back from the statute is one which is fairly apparent.
Thurgood Marshall
Women are women and men are men and you can draw that difference and that difference only in based money on.
Samuel Huntington
Well, I would submit simply that there are statistical differences here which do justify the different treatment.
I’d like to turn now to the Reed and Reed case.
In that case, as you will recall the Court reviewed an Idaho statute which provided that when competing applications to administer an estate were filed by a man and a woman in the same priority group, the man was to be given preference and appointed.
Now there is no evidence in the record that men as a class were better administrators than women and the Court rejected the contention that measure was justified to save litigation costs.
In short, there are no differences in the two classes of applicants, men and women which justify the discrimination.
By contrast, there are very real and relevant statistical differences between married military men as a class and married women which justify the, in our view justify the classifications under review in this case.
I would like to turn now to the question of the appropriate standard to be applied under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to determine the validity of these statutes.
To begin with, as this Court has held a numerous cases, traditional principles of equal protection developed under the Fourteenth Amendment are relevant in considering a tax under the Fifth Amended alleging that federal statutes unjustifiably discriminate between different classes of individuals.
Now as already as been touched upon here today, the traditional equal protection tests is the rational basis test.
Although originally developed in cases involving statutes regulating business, the test has been applied in recent years to cases involving economic and social benefits.
Now as both Mr. Levin and Professor Ginsburg have pointed out, the Court has imposed a stricter standard of review with respect to statutory classifications in two types of cases; those involving classifications which affect fundamental personal rights and those involving inherently suspect classifications.
As far as the personal rights are concerned, I would disagree with Mr. Levin that personal rights of the type which bring in to play this, the standard are involved here, the rights are two dependency benefits.
These are the same type of economic benefits which were under review in the Dandridge case and I think it’s not the type of personal rights which were under consideration in the Weber case which involved the relationship between illegitimate children and legitimate children within the family unit.
The rights here so we would say that the stricter review if it’s going to apply at all in this case, it must be because sex is a suspect classification.
Let me just comment briefly on Professor Gunther’s article in the Harvard Law Review.
He suggested there that in recent cases, this Court has not been limited simply to one, the polar extremes.
But that in reviewing statutes the Court has been taking a fairly close look even when applying the rational basis test to determine whether there is in fact some Government interest involved which can -- which is readily apparent and you don’t have to stretch the imagination to come up with it.
We would submit that in this case, the classifications here would stand scrutiny under that type of approach.
I would like to turn now to Professor Ginsburg’s argument that classifications based on sex are suspect for equal protection and due process purposes.
To begin with, as Professor Ginsburg acknowledges, this Court has never treated classifications based on sex as inherently suspect.
And only last term in Reed against Reed applied the traditional rational basis test.
In our view, the Court should not now abandon the traditional test and treat sex classifications as suspect.
Just last week in the Crest (ph) decision, which upheld the $50 filing fee for requirement as a pre-condition to discharge and bankruptcy, the Court referred to the suspect criteria of race, nationality, and alienage.
Now, race classifications of course have an especially disfavored status in our constitutional history.
And each of the three classifications in the words of Justice Blackmun in Graham against Richardson involves and I quote “a discreet and insular minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”
Now these minorities generally lack the political power to protect their own interest.
Now, we are not contending that women have achieved equal political power with men.
The statistics cited by Professor Ginsburg as to the number of women in high government positions in state and federal legislatures are certainly not in dispute, they’re very small.
What we do suggest is that because they are a numerical majority in the population as a whole, they have been exercising substantial and growing political influence upon state and federal legislatures.
At the federal level, as summarized in the ACLU’s brief, there has been considerable legislative activity in amending statutes containing classifications based on sex.
Proposed legislation to amend these statutes as I’ve already stated, was before Congress last year and undoubtedly will be before Congress this year.
And also of course the equal rights amendment which was passed last year is evidence -- is an indication of the influence that women who favor the amendment have been able to exert.
There is another reason for not expanding the category of suspect classifications to include women.
Unlike classifications based on race, nationality, or alienage, classifications based on sex frequently are not arbitrary, but reflect the actual differences between the sexes which are relevant to the purpose of the statutes containing the classifications.
Now, we contend here that the dependency statutes, for example, do not discriminate against women because of their femininity.
They treat women differently because women as a class are less likely to have dependents than men.
Similarly, the Florida statute upheld that Hoyt against Florida did not excuse women from jury duty because they were inferior, but excused them because of the fact that women as class were more likely than men to have family responsibilities, making it impractical for them to serve as jurors.
Application of the rational basis test permits the Courts to consider statutes on a case by case basis to determine which classifications are based on valid factual or physiological differences between the sexes and which classifications like the one struck down in Reed and Reed are arbitrary and not based on sex differences.
On the other hand, denominating sex classifications as suspect would subject all statutes containing sex classifications to strict review and could result in invalidating many of them whether or not individual classifications reflect acknowledged factual or physiological differences.
Warren E. Burger
But when you talk about generality of women as being less likely to have dependents, you mean dependents in this narrow sense, financially?
Samuel Huntington
Dependence as defined -- yes, dependence --
Warren E. Burger
In terms of children?
Samuel Huntington
No, in terms of dependent spouses, that’s what I mean.
Well, in closing, let me simply state that we have no quarrel with the drive of any women to achieve equality by attacking statutes enacted in a different era that may reflect antiquated notions of the respective roles of the sexes.
We submit, however, that the plea for across the board change rather than case by case consideration is better addressed to the legislature rather than to the courts.
In conclusion, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
Thank you.
Byron R. White
Could I ask you -- if we agreed with the other side, what do you understand the consequence would be?
Samuel Huntington
I understand the consequence would be that you would extend the same benefits to women.
I think --
Byron R. White
What would we strike down?
Samuel Huntington
You would strike down the portion of the statute which says that women have to establish dependency in fact in order to claim their wife as a --
Byron R. White
Or we strike that provision down which provides for their allowance then how do they get the allowance?
Samuel Huntington
No, you wouldn’t strike.
You would only strike down the part that requires them to establish dependency in fact in order to claim --
Byron R. White
Well, if you just strike down the discrimination, the other way of doing it would be to say that the -- is that the male must prove --
Samuel Huntington
The males must -- well, I would think that would definitely not be the preferable alternative.
Byron R. White
I didn’t say preferable, I wondered how do you know which one?
Samuel Huntington
Well, I think the -- I think the inquiry here would be what Congress would have wished had it been faced with the situation of not being able to make this classification and I think that the conclusion would have to be that they would wish that the --
Byron R. White
Could we just strike down that particular part of the statute of the provision, just those particular words?
Samuel Huntington
That’s right.
Yes.
Warren E. Burger
And then we construe all the other relevant statutes to mean and then women wherever it says men or --
Samuel Huntington
Well, just in this narrow context.
Warren E. Burger
I am talking about in these statutes.
Samuel Huntington
In Section -- in 43 -- 37 U.S.C. 401.
Warren E. Burger
So, we strike down one statute and rework some others?
Or at least --
Samuel Huntington
Well, no, just within the definition part itself would be the only -- if you simply said that the same standard have to apply to women as applies to men.
Byron R. White
Well, a --
Warren E. Burger
Well, couldn’t we just as easily, why couldn’t we just as easily say that since the allowances if that were the conclusion are discriminatory, all allowances are stricken?
Samuel Huntington
Well, I think that would fly right in the face of the purpose of Congress in adopting the dependency benefits statutes to be --
Warren E. Burger
Any more so than except as to numbers?
Samuel Huntington
Oh, yes, but well I think the numbers [Attempt to Laughter] are quite relevant when you’re talking about a million and a half men and only a couple of a thousand women married to civilians.
Warren E. Burger
You don’t want us to strike the allowances for men?
Samuel Huntington
No, we don’t want you to strike that and we don’t want you to require that the men’s applications for dependency allowances be examined in each case.
Byron R. White
Well, in fact in 401 the definition says that a dependent is a -- of a member of the service is one, his spouse; two, is unmarried minor child.
Samuel Huntington
Well, if you just struck the --
Byron R. White
And then down below it says however, the first is not a dependent of a female member unless he is in fact dependent on her for over half his support.
Now, what do we strike down?
Samuel Huntington
That sentence.
Byron R. White
That sentence.
Well, then there are no provisions for a man being independent, because up above, it’s just a female member, his spouse.
Samuel Huntington
Well, I think “his” means her in this context.
At least in certain areas --[Laughter]
Byron R. White
Obviously, I mean if the Constitution discriminated what, is that it?
Warren E. Burger
Right.
Samuel Huntington
Well, if the statute has always been construed to --
Byron R. White
Well, it doesn’t, is it so?
That means his, it means his because --
Samuel Huntington
Well, I mean take the next one, his unmarried legitimate child.
Byron R. White
Well, so we do have to change the meaning of “his” in one, don’t we?
Warren E. Burger
We have to make it really his or hers?
Byron R. White
We have to make it his or hers?
Samuel Huntington
Then why do a complete job.
You can do it but the way --[Laughter]
-- but the way the statute has been construed is interchangeable with her and his.
Thurgood Marshall
Well, should we assume that petitioners cases in this case are not in favor of cutting out all of the allowances that the wife gets.
Samuel Huntington
Well, you could certainly assume that and we’re not suggesting that you do that.
Thank you.
Warren E. Burger
You have three minutes left, Mr. Levin if you wish to use it.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
I would do answer Mr. Justice White about which provision of the statute should be struck.
Warren E. Burger
Rewritten?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
First of all, I think you don’t get into any trouble by striking that portion that begins however and in support.
Byron R. White
Why not?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Because I don’t believe that “his” means his in the masculine --
Byron R. White
It means not -- now doesn’t it?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
No, sir.
It doesn’t mean it now.
Because the only limitation you have is down here is not a dependent of a female member unless he is in fact dependent on her for over one-half the --
Warren E. Burger
What page of what document?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
I am looking at page 23 (a) of the appendix.
Warren E. Burger
Of the appendix?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
Yes, sir.
Last paragraph.
Warren E. Burger
Hmm.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
But I certainly wouldn’t construe “his” in the masculine or feminine sense.
Byron R. White
Or we need to strike that one sentence?
That’s what we’re talking about?
Joseph J. Levin, Jr.
I believe that that would extend the benefits to all, yes sir.
I think the Government has misconstrued the basic question here and the basic purpose of the statute.
The basic purpose of these statutes in the legislative history shows this is to extend these benefits to men and women, that’s the language that the legislature use and the proponents of the legislation used.
And the idea was to encourage re-enlistment of men and women and it said more than once, so that is the legislative history.
Anything else, would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of the statutes.
I think we lose sight of the issue that no matter how many figures are thrown after the court that nevertheless you get right down to rock-bottom, women who are identically situated to men as in the case of Lieutenant Frontiero don’t receive either housing benefits or medical benefits and there can’t be no justification for that kind of situation.
The Government talked in terms of forms that have to be filled out.
Well, I know for military experience that there are hundred forms that have to be filled out when you go in.
Men, all service people have to inform the Government as to how many dependents they have and a variety of other items in order to determine initially what kind of payments they might be eligible to receive.
So you’re not asking for any, if you extend it all the way around, you certainly wouldn’t be asking for any extension.
You just have to require a quality of root, I prefer to call it that.
This Senate Bill has been discussed by the Government, of course, is speculative and it's only perspective as I read it would not apply whatsoever to assist Lieutenant Frontiero and her husband.
I think in Reed versus Reed that the lower court there talked in terms of a difference and the experience of men and women and attempted to justify the classification that way.
Well, statistics in that case could just as easily have shown that more than in any business world than are women and that con -- and have more and consequently, they have more experience of the classification would then be justified, once again, under the administrative convenience justification.
I think you get into a problem when you try and ask the question what is the definition of dependency.
The Government seems to want to use one-half dependent in the case of women who are seeking to have their husbands as dependents but to use another classification that is just general dependency of bread winning in the case of men, and we think that this cannot in any way be justified.
Warren E. Burger
Thank you.
The case is submitted.
dd
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